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Abstract






 In this paper, we develop the canonical robust contract theory : Principal 
does not know exactly, or does not believe the basic components of agency 
relationship. He designs the optimal incentive contract based on the worst 
case for him. First we investigate situation where principal does believe 
mis-specification in characteristics of agent’s utility function and evaluates 
contracts assuming agent with minimizing utility is working for him. We 
derive Innes(1990)’s debt contract is quite robust under this 
mis-specification and optimal. Second, we investigate the situation where 
the principal is now unaware of technology for which agent works. Using 
Hansen and Sargent(2011)’s argument, we derive that ambiguous 
information makes the contract similar to a contract which risk averse 
principal optimally designs. Last, We provide another possible approach to 
robust agency problem in Appendix.
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 In economics, the theory of agency has been highlighted as the lens of 
viewing human activities in economy as the natural reaction to individual 
interest and incentive system. For example, people such as many CEOs 
manipulate the unobservable actions of workers through the contract 
function on observable performance measures and this contract gives some 
‘incentive’ to work hard for many workers in firms. Principal-agent theory 
makes us to deal with this procedure in a mathematically tractable way 
and enlightens the ways various incentives affect human behaviors.
 In general, theory of contract has been making extensive progress in 
dealing with some aspects especially. First it gives insights about how to 
give proper incentives to workers in firms using optimal contract. Also it 
deals with how to allocate jobs in organization, the method of designing 
efficient contingency claims in financial market, and how to allocate several 
tasks effectively to make firm’s profit higher. Also as the 2008 global 
financial crisis hit the world and crisis has debilitated the global economy, 
the interest about proper incentive system and risk-management policy in 
wall-street firms and even local banks is soaring among the economics 
profession.
 The classical contract theories have deep problems : It assumes there is 
given economic environment where agent meets principal, works for him 
and agent and principal regard this economic environment as their 
common knowledge in game-theoretical sense. For example, 
Holmstrom(1979) makes principal-agent problems with 3 components of 
economic environment such as {     }1) with each component 
regarded as purely exogenous.
 However, in real world, there is little thing known about the stochastic 
output distribution as action of agents varies. Also if even principal does 
not know about his own utility function, then how is it possible to know his 
1) The first component is stochastic output density representing working technology. The 
second and third are about agent’s utility function and cost of effort.
- 6 -
worker’s utility functional form? Even if there are some known facts about 
distribution and preference, principal may not believe those facts and he 
may try to contrive the feasible environment which he can believe.
 There has been a long history in economics profession about how to deal 
with the uncertainty and especially Hansen and Sargent(2011), using the 
robust-control theory, derives how to make the optimal control which is 
quite robust under these kinds of uncertainties. Their logic is that 
economic agent contrives his own minimizing component which she does 
not know or believe under the so-called relative entropy constraint. When 
she chooses optimal control, she incorporates the contingent minimal 
environment which is under the uncertainty and find the ‘robustly’ optimal 
control. This approach makes possible that agents can deal with the 
worst-case scenario and because they do not know about exact 
distribution, agents might want to maximize the worst-case payoffs using 
robust-controls. We adapt and change this approach to canonical 
principal-agent problems and see how the fundamental results change.
 The paper with bright ideas and mathematics, written by Carroll(2013), 
acknowledges the above fact but focuses on different kinds of uncertainty 
and using that ambiguity, he derives optimal simple contract under risk 
neutrality of an agent : linear contract. He acknowledges that principal in 
general may not know the feasible set of actions available to the agent. So 
principal is ambiguous about this set of feasible actions and robustly 
chooses the contract by maximizing his minimal payoff according to the 
available action set. However, in the model, this paper lets the agent in 
principal-agent relationship choose the functional form of distribution so 
that agent has more degree of freedom in choosing his action than in 
Holmstrom (1979). This makes a lot of mathematical proofs possible in their 
paper. Also, more importantly, it is more plausible that principal does not 
have information about utility function of an agent or output density, 
rather than agent’s feasible action set.
 Another paper by Shannon et al(2011) presents a principal-agent model in 
which the agent has imprecise beliefs using the incomplete preference 
system. The agent, when he chooses his optimal action, must compare 
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alternative actions given the contract function. However in their model, he 
may compare some of feasible actions and cannot compare others so that 
when he cannot choose what is better option for him, he just chooses the 
outside option : the reservation utility. In this setting they derive that the 
bonus contract with only one-step bonus is optimal.
 This paper consists of two parts. The next section starts with basic model. 
The first section is about the situation where principal doesn’t know the 
exact form of agent’s utility function in an agency model. The second 
section is about the situation where principal doesn’t believe the specifed 
technology  and he himself thinks the worst case technology according to 
Hansen and Sargent(2007)’s multiplier preference.2) Through these two 
parts, we find how to make exogenously given environment of agency 
somewhat ‘endogenous’ by coming up with the endogenous environment in 
which principal-agent relation begins. Paper ends with conclusion with 
some future research areas.
2. The Model
2.1. Analysis of Ambiguity-Averse Principal-agent Relationship
    : The utility case
 The relationship consists of risk-neutral principal and risk-averse agent 
with utility  . As in standard agency setting, the technology process 
   is common-knowledge to both principal and agent. However, in 
contrast to Holmstrom(1979), principal only knows that his employee is risk 
averse, but does not know what his utility’s exact functional form is. In 
this paper only uncertainty behind this relationship is agent’s preference 
structure, so we model the aversion of principal to this kind of 
2) This preference is represented by adding up the relative entropy term. This kind of utility 
representation is aximatized through adding some assumptions. See Strzalecki(2011).
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“ambiguity”.
 Principal thinks that the agent has the worst preference which may be 
harmful to his own payoff, and take consideration to this kind of ambiguity 
when designing the optimal incentive contract. Also, the timeline of this 
game is the same as Holmstrom(1979), Kim(1995) and other static contract 
literatures. To be specific, first, principal offers the contract to agent, and 
if agent signs on it, the agent inputs the best effort to maximize his own 
indirect utility given the contract. At the end of period, the stochastic 
output  is realized according to technology   , and principal pays   
to agent. 
 We assume that stochastic output  is confined to bounded support   
and         , so that the problems of infinity do not arise in the 
model. We restrict that the distribution   has the full support so      
point-wisely for . Also, as in other standard agency settings, we impose 
Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property(MLRP) and First-order Stochastic 
Dominance about .3)

     is increasing in ∀ and    ≤  for ∀ ∀
 Also in many cases, we assume the limited-liability of agent : ≥ , 
which is often necessary to make sure the existence of optimal contract in 
standard principal-agent problems.4) In addition to agent’s limited-liability, 
we assume limited-liability of principal’s  side :  ≥  as in 
Innes(1990). We may interpret agent’s limited liability constraint as the 
real-world “minimum-wage” policy in labor market and principal’s limited 
liability as the mechanism to prevent principal’s “sabotaging activity” for 
output.
 General contract function, the tool of incentive provision, is the function 
of stochastic output  by itself. We define the feasible contract by its 
3) In fact, Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property(MLRP) implies FOSD conditions. See 
Milgrom(1981).
4) Theorists often call this property Mirrlees’ ‘Unpleasant theorem’ because it can be 
possible that there is no optimal second-best contract in standard settings without 
agent’s limited liability.
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measurability with respect to Lebesgue-measure. In simple notation, if  is 
set of feasible contracts, then we denote it as follows.
     →    ·    
 Principal thinks that agent’s utility function is not risk-loving, but does 
not know exactly. Or we interpret the situation as the agent tells to the 
principal about his utility function, but principal thinks there is some 
mis-specification in that preference so does not believe that information. 
By this logic, He evaluates incentive contracting according to worst-case 
utility of agent that minimizes principal’s value function and so wants to 
design the contract robust to this kind of uncertainty.
(1) Benchmark Case : No Restriction on Agent’s utility
 In this case, principal’s information about an agent’s utility is that the 
utility function is not risk loving and he does not infer other kinds of 
properties of agent’s utility. We can set-up principal’s optimization program 
as follows. Optimizing in the following case is kind of convex-optimization, 
so we can formulate the Lagrangian and use the variation method as 
usual.
max ·min ·     subject to :
                               ≥         (PC)
                       ∈arg′   ′  ′        (IC)
                                   ≤  ′ ≤                      (MN)
                                ≤ ≤  ∀∈                 (LL)
                                     ″·≤                       (RA)
 The max  operator can be imposed because if there exists multiple 
actions  satisfying (IC), principal may mandate the action which maximizes 
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his own utility among them. 
 Now we look at each constraint and how constraints can be interpreted in 
this particular program. The first constraint (PC) is so-called individual 
rationality constraint. However in this model, in addition to participation 
constraint, it imposes some important restrictions on the agent’s utility 
level : It is the constraint which settles agent’s satisfaction level from   
to some fixed level. Without this constraint, the minimizing utility of agent 
is that ≃ function, so very large payment is needed to make agent work 
for principal.
 Also we impose Innes(1990)’ assumption about incentive contract  , 
 ≤  ′ ≤ , so that the principal’s payoff   is increasing function of 
. This constraint implies that the higher agent’s effort level, the expected 
payoff of principal becomes higher because of increasing property of 
 . So given the contract, the principal wants agent to input more 
effort .5)
 Due to the monotonicity constraint, when principal gives any feasible 
contract   ,   has also the finite support 

    likewise  has the 
finite support  .
Theorem 1. In the above program, the fixed-wage contract survives as an 
optimal contract and an agent exert the minimal effort :   
Proof. For any feasible contract of which  ≤  ′ ≤  holds, principal is 
made worse as the agent exerts less effort level due to the   of   . 
So the minimizing utility of program is such that the agent with this utility 
exerts the least effort. 
 If we think of   which is concave and      ∀∈ 

   , then agent does 
not ‘feel’ any incentive because his utility function is constant, as follows:
5) This can be proved by First-order stochastic domance(FOSD) of  , supported by 
MLRP. The expected value of increasing function  becomes bigger as the agent 
inputs more effort .
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 ∈arg   ′  ′    ′    ′ ∴  
 Because any feasible contract, with minimizing utility associated with that 
contract, induces no incentive,  , principal’s optimization program is to 
choose constant utility level  and contract. Because the principal gets 
worse-off as agent’s general satisfaction level is low, the minimizing utility 
is that      ∀ , so the fixed-wage contract    solves the 
following program because of limited liability constraint.
 ·    subject to :
      ≥ 
 ≥  ∀∈  
Proof ended.
 The basic intuition of the proof is that for any given feasible contract 
, we can find the constant utility  over the support of contract 
  , with which the agent does not exert any effort. As a result, 
principal also does not have any incentive to give more than minimum 
wage   .
 This theorem explains some widespread real-world phenomenon. In 
short-term agency relations or when principal does not investigate enough 
about his employee’s preference, like in blue-color jobs, minimum wage is 
prevalent among principal-agent relationships because employer considers 
the worst case utility for his employee for robustness issue, 
(2) Restriction on Marginal Utility of Agent
 In the benchmark case as above, the principal regards that agent’s utility 
function is not risk-loving, but does not infer any information about other 
characteristics of utility. In this section, we assume that principal thinks 
- 12 -
marginal utility of agent is bounded. 
 Too much high marginal utility of an agent implies agent feels naturally 
higher incentive to work given any contract  . In contrast, too low 
marginal utility tells us that agent does not have enough incentive to work 
for principal. We exclude such extreme situation. Also we impose that 
utility level is such that it must be  is bounded below. This condition is 
surely important for existence of solution.
 So we let the upper and lower bound of agent’s marginal utility be 
∞      and we may assume that ( ) are finite because the 
support of    is bounded so that diminishing marginal utility ″≤  
does not contradict with this finite assumption. 
 For example,   utility whose ′ diverges to ∞  as →  may not be 
excluded in the feasible utility set because we restrict    to be 
bounded below and above and not to include 0.
 In such a case, principal’s optimization scheme can be constructed as 
follows.
max ·min ·      subject to :
                                 ≥         (PC)
                         ∈arg′   ′  ′        (IC)
                                     ≤  ′ ≤                       (MN)
                                   ≤ ≤  ∀∈                 (LL)
                                     ≤ ′≤                       (MU)
                                        ″·≤                       (RA)
                                         ≥                        (SC)
 Using the first-order approach of agency problem6), we replace the (IC) 
constraint by following first order condition constraint with respect to the 
6) We assume that the first-order approach is valid. Grossman and Hart(1983) and 
Rogerson(1985) show that MLRP and CDFC are sufficient for the validity of the first-order 
approach when the signal space is of one dimension. Jewitt(1988) finds less restrictive 
conditions for the validity of the first-order approach with the conditions on agent’s 
utility. Recently, Conlon(2012) and Kim and Jung(2013) find the conditions justifying 
first-order approach in general cases for multi-dimensional signal case.
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action .
max ·min ·     subject to :
                                 ≥           (PC)
                                   ′            (IC)’
                                    ≤  ′ ≤                         (MN)
                                 ≤ ≤  ∀∈                    (LL)
                                      ≤ ′≤                      (MU)
                                       ″·≤                         (RA)
                                        ≥                          (SC)
Theorem 2. For any feasible contract that satisfies constraints of above 
program, there is an optimal contract which is debt contract7). and a 
principal-agent relation cannot obtain the first best outcome. In other 
words, uncertainty about agent’s utility cannot bring the similar result to 
the case of risk-neutral agent of Harris and Raviv(1979)
Proof. The proof has 3 recursive steps for finding minimax solution for 
utility and contact.
Step 1. Inner minimization finding -function given   function.
 For any feasible contract of which  ≤  ′ ≤  holds, we define the 
probability distribution on -space as    such that        
with 

        .8) Then the (PC) and (IC) constraints also are 
transformed using the -space representation.
7) This form of optimal contract is suggested by many seminal papers including Innes(1999), 
which formulates the simple second-best debt contract.
8) In fact, the composition of two absolutely continuous functions is not necessarily 
absolutely continuous. If   is Lipshitz continuous and  is absolutely continuous, it is 
known the ∘ is absolutely continuous within well-defined domain. We do not take 
into account these complicated issues for simplicity.
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           ≥    ⇒       ≥           (PC)
            ′    ⇒          ′           (IC)’
 Now, let the solution of second-step minimization be    and assume 
that ′     holds for some positive Lebesgue measure on -space. Then, 
there exists  such that ′     and it single crosses the utility function 
  from above and satisfies  ≥  and the following level condition.
                   
→             ,           
Figure 1. The utility function comparison
 Because we assume the first-order approach is valid in this case,    
satisfies (IC)’. By Lemma 1 below, we finally get the inequality, which with a 
valid   implies the action   under   is smaller than . Because of the 
monotonicity constraint  ≤ ′≤  ∀, given the contract , smaller 
action     of agent yields smaller profit for principal, which means 
   is not the minimal solution of second-step minimization. 
        ′         ′        
        ≤ 
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 It is the contradiction, and    should be the case that ′    ∀ . 
To summarize, principal robustly thinks that the agent who works for him 
is risk-neutral agent whose marginal utility is   uniformly. 
Step 2. Outer maximization formulation
 For any feasible contract of which  ≤  ′ ≤  holds, we found the 
worst-case utility of agent to be risk-neutral and ′    ∀ . Then we 
may assume        because the constant term may be dependent 
upon the given contract  . For example, for an agent to participate in 
this relationship, his indirect utility given  should be bigger than .
 If we define   such that an agent with        chooses an action   
given  , for agent to participate, the following inequality holds for  .
 ≥  ≡        
 However, because principal becomes worse as the agent’s general 
satisfaction level goes down, the minimizing utility has the constant term as 
low as possible, and this value is     . Now we formulate the outer 
maximization program.
max ·     subject to :
                                ≥           (PC)
                                  ′           (IC)’
                                   ≤  ′ ≤                       (MN)
                               ≤ ≤  ∀∈                  (LL)
 Assume that the solution of the above program is    . Then 
participation constraint must hold because we let   be such that it makes 
participation constraint binding. In other words, we solve the optimization 
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program without participation constraint first, and then can fine-tune the 
   to have the participation constraint binding.
 So we ignore the participation constraint and find the conditions that   
should satisfy. Then   should solve the following optimization as we 
ignore the (PC) and only consider (IC’), (MN), and (LL) :
max ·     subject to :
                               

 ′                  (IC)’
                                    ≤  ′ ≤  ∀                  (MN)
                                ≤ ≤  ∀∈                  (LL)
 We define new cost function  ≡   so that the optimization 
program above can be transformed into the following standard 
principal-agent model with monotonicity constraint and limited liability as 
in Innes(1990).
max ·     subject to :
                                  ′                    (IC)’
                                      ≤  ′ ≤                       (MN)
                                   ≤ ≤  ∀∈                  (LL)
 This program is solved in Innes(1999)9), and in that paper, he solves the 
second-best solution of above program with participation constraint using 
the debt contract. We can use the same strategy to prove that the form of 
debt contract is optimal even without the participation constraint. Then the 
optimal contract is of following form.
  max         only for  ≥ 
9) Proposition 1 of Kim(1999) states the condition in which first-best bonus contract may 
exist.
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 The only remaining problem to solve is to find optimal value of  . Debt 
contract satisfies monotonicity and limited liability constraints so to find 
optimal   is equivalent to following optimization program. This program can 
be solved using general Kuhn-Tucker theorem.
max

       subject to :
                               


      ′               (IC)
Proof ended.
                                 
Lemma 1. Following inequality from the first part of the above theorem 
holds and    cannot be the minimizing solution.
        ≤ 
Proof Using the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property, we define the new 
variable  which is score function of   . Because contract   is 
monotonically increasing10) and we already defined    so that it satisfies 
      ,          also holds.
≡ 

     

    increases as  and    increases
 We then define the new function based on -variable : 
 ≡    ≡  . Also as we did above, we define the probability 
distribution on space using transformation law.
          . 
10) Even if the contract is not strictly increasing, we can use the same argument without 
using -space. We directly transform -space representation to -space representation 
and argue the same result.
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 Then, we can prove the Lemma using the method similar to Innes(1990). 
          ⇒           
           

          
       ·






 ′  ′′   ′


 ′  ′′   ′
 We know, from single crossing property between    and   , for  to 
be satisfied, it must be the case where   single crosses   from above 
and following is satisfied.


 ′  ′′   ′≥  , ∀
      

 ′  ′′   ′≤ 
∴                ≤ 
Proof ended
 The intuition for theorem 2 is clear and straightforward : We restrict that 
agent’s marginal utility has both lower bound   and upper bound   
point-wisely. This constraint can be interpreted as several distinct ways. 
First, we may think that even in the situation where principal does not 
have any information about his agent’s utility functional form, he regards 
the agent as having some ‘sense’ of incentive to work hard so that his 
utility function is not the constant function. Or we might think that given 
Inada condition, support of    , and    is small enough. Then 
agent’s marginal utility may be bounded below and above in that region.
 According to this theorem, given some contract  ·, minimizing utility of 
agent for principal is such that agent’s sensitiveness to incentive is 
minimal, and minimal sense of incentive is represented by minimal 
marginal utility ′    ∀ . Thus the linear utility, which says that agent 
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is risk-neutral, makes possible that debt contract induces second best 
optimal incentive structure.
 Classical moral hazard theory generally separates the case according to 
agent’s utility : risk-neutral case and risk-averse case. And two cases must 
be analyzed very differently because of technical programming method. 
This theorem, with the concept of ambiguity aversion of principal, makes 
possible that two cases may be linked. So we derive the simple contract 
optimally : Debt contract. And this theorem shows quite strongly that 
Innes(1990)’s contract is robust against this kind of information uncertainty.
2.2. Analysis of Ambiguity-Averse Principal-agent : Technology case
 This section deals with the situation where the stochastic technology 
   is not the common knowledge of both principal and agent, but only 
agent knows the true functional forms and other settings are the same with 
the standard agency frameworks.11)
 Or we assume the situation in which there is some benchmark fact that 
production process follows the distribution   . The principal, by years 
of interaction with agent, has got empirical distribution of production 
technology. The real problem is that the agent believes this fact but 
principal thinks that there might be some noisy measure distorting the 
benchmark density of   . He thinks other possible parametrized density 
functions may describe the technology possibly and wants to protect 
against the distribution which minimizes his indirect utility.
 We describe this situation by setting that principal is ‘ambiguity-averse’ 
and wants to design the optimal contract which is robust to this kind of 
Knightian uncertainty. As Hansen and Sargent(2007) noted, this principal 
comes up with his original distribution    and   represents the 
worst-case distribution for the principal around -distribution. We model as 
  and   are more discrepant, he feels bad about this uncertainty.
11) For standard agency framework, see Holmstrom(1979), Grossman and Hart(1983), and 
Kim(1995).
- 20 -
 All of these characteristics can be described well by using the 
Kullbeck-Leibler entropy measure between  and   to characterize the 
discrepancy between  and . We assume that principal chooses the   
distribution in the following entropy ball around   for each a.
≡    ≥    log
  
 ≤     
 Then the principal’s optimization program can be constructed using the 
fact that he chooses his own worst distribution   in  to minimize 
expected utility under any contract  . Because this entropy constraint is 
always binding in the minimization step, we change the program and 
include the entropy value times multiplier   in the objective function.
 In general, we fix the value of  and find Lagrange multiplier   
endogenously by first order condition. In this problem however, we fix 
value of  , solve first order condition, and substitute the solution to find 
the value of . To be specific, as   increases, we know that  generally 
decreases so principal is not much ambiguity averse. In contrast, as   
decreases, we know that corresponding  increases and this implies 
principal is much ambiguity averse so that chooses the minimizing   in the 
much bigger entropy ball around . That means, we may interpret the fixed 
   as the ‘measure of concern for robustness’.
 Now, the two-step optimization procedure is represented as the following 
form.
max   min       log
  
 subject to :
   ≥ ,     ′  
    
Theorem 3. In this setting where principal has a constant ambiguity 
aversion to the technology uncertainty, the optimal contract is the 
observationally equivalent to the one in the case where principal has the 
- 21 -
constant absolute risk aversion  .
 In other words, we cannot discriminate the situation where principal has 
   ambiguity aversion and    risk-aversion by seeing the form of 
contract.
Proof. This proof has 2 recursive steps for finding minimax solution for   
and  .
Step 1. This step is minimization step which finds   that minimizes the 
principal’s welfare given the contract  and induced . If we define the 
Lagrange multiplier on the normalization of   to be , the first-order 
condition for   is given below ;
  log 
  
    
 log
  
     , log
  
    
 
∴   
  exp    
  exp    

 exp    
  exp    
 So we get minimizing distribution    for the principal given the value 
of  . In denominator of the above right-hand side,  means the 
integration using the original distribution . Then we substitute this result 




     log exp     
 log
  
   log exp    
  log
  
    log exp    
            log exp    
∴      logexp      
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Step 2. This step is maximization step which finds optimal contract  
and induced action  that maximize the principal’s value function derived 
in above step. The program is simple.
max         logexp       subject to :
   ≥ ,     ′  
 Because the logarithmic function is monotonically increasing, and   , 
this optimization program can be made simpler by a monotone 
transformation which eliminates the logarithmic function. The changed 
program is given.
max       exp       subject to :
   ≥ ,     ′  
 This program is reproduced when the principal with constant absolute risk 
aversion    meets the agent and designs the optimal contract  . 
Proof Ended
 The result is simple and straightforward. As the   gets bigger, the 
principal’s worst case distribution   becomes smaller in those points 
because that would be the worst case. So principal, even with his 
risk-neutrality, can experience phenomena similar to the decreasing 
marginal utility in probability. These stories can be matched to the 
‘Murphy’s Law’ and we use term ‘Statistical Murphy’s Law’ to explain this 
phenomenon.
 To emphasize, we assumed constant ambiguity aversion    of principal 
and it is surprising that this principal uses the same incentive scheme with 
other principal with    constant risk aversion. The following Lemma 2 is 
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crucial to prove the next result.
Lemma 2. If principal with utility function · is risk-averse and agent is 
risk-neutral, in contrast with usual relationships, the only optimal contract 
is the fixed-rent contract as in Harris and Raviv(1979)
Proof Using the similar arguments to Holmstrom(1979), principal’s 
optimization program is equivalent to find the saddle point of the following 
Lagrangian function.
max                ′
 As in Holmstrom(1979), the first order conditions which optimal contract 
and action must satisfy are as follows : Using this we want to show that 
  at the saddle point.
 ′     
     with  ′ : decreasing function
          ″   where 
     ″
 First, we assume   and show that there arises the contradiction. Let 
≡  and we define the constant  such that  ′  . We partition 
the space into   and   by defining  {     ≥ } and  
{       } for an optimal action . On   and  , the following results 
hold and there exists the contradiction with the first-order conditions.
 ′  

  ≤    ′ → ≥  on 
 ′   

       ′ →    on 
∴          →   for the above condition : 
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contradiction.
 Second, we assume    and show that there arises the contradiction. In 
this case, on   and  , following results hold and there exists the 
contradiction with the first-order conditions as in the other case.
 ′  

  ≥    ′ → ≤  on 
 ′   

       ′ →    on 
∴          →   for the above condition : 
contradiction.
 So we conclude that    at the optimum and the optimal contract 
   ′   is of the same form as fixed-rent contract. We know that 
with risk neutral principal and agent, there are infinitely many optimal 
first-best contract. However, in this case, the first-best implementable 
contract is only Harris-Raviv’s fixed-rent contract.
Proof Ended
 With the case in Lemma 2, principal is risk-averse but an agent is 
risk-neutral. So risk sharing and incentive provision problem are aligned in 
the same direction : Agent takes all the risk not to give any risk to 
principal while feeling the maximal incentive to work. So first-best outcome 
can be achieved only through the fixed-rent contract. So we get the 
following corollary.
Corollary 1. In the theorem 3, if the agent is risk-neutral, the only optimal 
contract is the fixed-rent contract regardless of the value of robustness 
concern  .
 So Harris-Raviv’s fixed-rent contract is quite robust under this 
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distributional uncertainty with multiplier preference of the principal. The 
principal is uncertain about the production process so delegates whole firm 
production to an agent to get rid of ambiguous decisions.
3. Conclusion
 In this paper, we analyze two different case : the case where principal 
does not know or believe exact functional form of an agent’s utility, and 
the case where principal does not know or believe the stochastic output 
density according to the action. The first case checks the robustness of the 
contract suggested by Innes(1990) and this contract is simple itself. We may 
interpret this as the reason people do not use the fine-tuning contract 
given by Holmstrom(1979). The second case deals with the case of 
uncertain output density. In adapting Hansen and Sargent(2011)’s multiplier 
preference framework, we obtain that the risk-aversion and 
ambiguity-aversion of a principal do yield the same contract function.
 For future research, maybe it would be interesting to use this model’s 
idea to the uncertainty asymmetry in financial intermediary market and 
investment banking industry, because in financial market, uncertainty or 
unknown risk is more important in aspects of risk-management and if we 
adapt this model, we may find more efficient way to robustly incentivize 
the workers under uncertainty of information. For these kinds of work to 
be possible, it should be interesting to research the dynamic robust agency 
model.
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Ⅳ. Appendix : Saddle-function approach of robustness
 In case 1 : benchmark model and restricted model, we solve the 
sequential ′maxmin′ program stepwisely, and in the inner minimization 
procedure, the monotonicity assumption  ≤ ′≤  is crucial to make 
clear that the principal wants the agent to work hard and less effort 
deteriorates principal’s payoff.
 We approach the problem in slightly different way in this section. In the 
case 1, to emphasize, firstly given the contract function  · we find the 
minimizing utility  · of agent in the interest of principal, and 
incorporating this utility function  , which depends on given contract 
function, we find the optimal contract function  . So each contract meets 
different utility function of agent that minimizes principal’s payoff, and 
when principal chooses optimal contract, he considers this kind of 
contingency plan.
 The principal thinks the agent’s utility function follows some common 
properties. Given the feasible contract, he calculates the worst case utility 
in the specific set of utilities. We also here assumes that derivative of 
agent’s utility is at least   and less than   :
  ≥ ′≥  ∀
 In this appendix, we synthesize the two step optimization into 
saddle-function program. First we find the minimizing utility given the 
contract function  . In contrast with the case 1, we find the optimal 
contract   given the utility function of agent . In other words, we find the 
contract function and utility function jointly with saddle relationship to 
each other. This program might be interpreted similarly as in the case 1 : 
principal may find the minimizing utility function of agent   given the 
contract  . However in contrast to the above section, we fix the utility   
and find the optimal contract  . And     ends the solving 
procedure. This is kind of saddle shape functional form and the solution of 
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this program may be different from that of above two-step ′maxmin′ 
optimization.
 One reader may argue that the solutions are the same across (Case 1) 
and (Appendix) because we found in the above theorem 2 that the 
minimizing utility is of the same functional form across any contract 
function satisfying the monotonicity constraint. We will check it using 
direct optimization.
 In this case, we also assume the monotonicity constraint of contract   to 
find analytic solution but this constraint is not the crucial constraint 
because here we relax the problem with different optimization approach. It 
is the kind of difference between minimax strategy and Nash equilibrium 
strategy in non-cooperative game situation. Here we find the relevant 
‘Nash’-type equilibrium.
 Also as we did above, we also assume so-called ‘first-order approach’ for 
mathematical tractability. The original optimization program(OP) is 
constructed as follows :
 · ·     subject to :
    ≥ 
     ′  
 ≤ ′≤  ⇒ ′  ≥  
 To make clear this program to satisfy the sufficiency for Kuhn-Tucker 
theorem, we introduce the auxiliary function  that behaves as a convex 
function : ≥  when  ≥  and    when   . and  ′   for 
∀ and ″  when  ≥ . We may take        →  for 
example. Also, from above section, we are able to infer that ′ ≤   ∀  
is not binding in the extremum.
 Now we construct the convexified optimization program(COP) as follows:
 · ·     subject to :
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    ≥ 
     ′  
′  ≥ 
 To solve this program, we introduce the total Lagrangian  , collect the 
terms of utility, and use the variation method to find the extremum, or 
minimal path-dependence. We may start with defining the proper Lagrange 
multipliers on each of constraints.
 First let Lagrange multiplier which is imposed on participation constraint 
and incentive constraint be ,  respectively. and let the point-wise 
Lagrange multiplier on the upward sloping constraint . We can 
construct the Lagrangian using these multipliers and do not impose 
limited-liability constraint, monotonicity constraint and concavity condition 
in constructing the Lagrange function, and only after solving first-order 
condition, we check the solution satisfies these constraint and characterize 
the solution.
 As we discussed above, total Lagrangian function and terms about utility 
function is given here. Due to the Kuhn-Tucker condition, we know that 
multiplier , point-wisely, is non-negative : ≥ , and by the 
complementarity slackness, ′     at the extremum solution. 
Lastly, we factorize ≡      for mathematical convenience.12) 
 The Lagrangian function is constructed and in contrast with the proof of 
theorem 2, we attack the solution of optimization program more ‘directly’ 
with techniques of Kuhn Tucker theorem.
                ′
′    ≥  for∀ ≥ 
          ′   
12) Because we assumed distribution has the full-support,       holds point-wisely 
on the domain.
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Theorem 4. At extremum, for increasing optimal contract,    ∀. In 
other words, the upward-sloping constraint is binding and principal 
assumes that agent’s utility function has the constant-slope point-wisely. 
So principal may assume agent has a linear utility in this case too as in 
Theorem 2.
Proof. Proof has 3 recursive steps for finding minimax solution for utility 
and contact.
Step 1. Now let’s assume the solution of (COP)   satisfies  ≤ ′≥ , 
so    has the finite support 

    likewise  has the finite support 
 . We analyze the minimizing utility given this contract function first.
 We assume we can change probability distribution from    to  space 
distribution    such that       .13) Also likelihood ratio   is 
well-defined. Then using the change of variable, we define 
  ≡     .
          ′     
              ′     
 Because specified contract is monotonic, 

        , we can think 
that    is the integral of functional   ′     which comprises 
 ′  and other functional form of  . we collect the terms and 
summarize the Lagrangian   .
            ′     
            ′       ′    
 Note            ′         ′     and 
13) There can be the atom in the distribution of   or distribution function of   is not 
absolutely continuous. In that case,    can be used instead of    without 










   ′     is 
satisfied.14) This end-point condition is crucial for finding analytic solution 
using dynamic programming. 
 Also we calculate  ′     ′′      because 

        , 
 ′ 

   ′    also holds. Then, what we have to do is to find the 
minimal path  of   that minimizes  . We assume differentiability of utility 
function except on the measure-zero region and let    is the solution. 
Then, for any given well-defined continuous mapping , the path 
    achieves the minimum at    necessarily. That means:
    ′  ′    ≡ 
      ′  ′    ≥        ′     


        ′   ′
 And we separate the first-term and second term and use the 
integration-by-parts technique to second-term. By  ′  

   ′    , we 
can eliminate the boundary values and just switch the steps of integration 
by this process.





 ′    

 ′   


         ′   ′     

 ′   
∴
 
        ′   ′     

 ′       ∀
∴    ′        ′    ′     
 These analyses result in ‘Euler-Lagrange equation’ and we may use this 
necessary condition to justify our result.         , and 
 ′     ′′      so at the minimal solution, the following 
relation must hold.
14) In fact, we implicitly assume that Lagrange multiplier   is not divergent at the 
extremum solution.
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               ′′        ′
 So we summarize this result and move on to the second step.
∴     ′′      
 

 ′   ′  ′





 ′  ′  ′
Step 2. Now, given that utility function is weakly concave15), we find 
first-order condition in   of  . To be specific, let us use the original 
Lagrangian function  , not    to find the first-order condition for . 
And we may use Step 1 and 2’s results jointly.
 We can point-wisely differentiate   from ’s measurability and 
differentiability and if the   function is linear in  , the coefficient should 
be zero to make the solution of program   not the corner solution.
    ′   ′          ′′   ″  
∴′




 In this kind of optimal contract, by the assumed MLRP about technology 
, if we get ≥ ,   is the increasing function of 16) so we may 
think that  should also be the increasing function of . Anyway, we 
get that   .
′
    ′′  ″ 
 

    
15) Actually, this weak concavity presumes that linear function can be approximated to be 
concave locally.
16) Several standard agency models implement the Rogerson(1985)’s double-relaxing analysis 
and obtain ≠ to prove  , using the fact that principal should give the agent an 
incentive to work hard. However, in our model, the logic like this cannot work and the 
sign of  is not the central problem. 
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Step 3. Now, we use the Step 1 and 2’s results to find the optimum of 
(COP). If the optimal contract is increasing, probability measure is changed 
from -space to   and represented by Radon-Nikodym derivative 
    . So        holds and likelihood ratio is unchanging.


    

   ∀   





 ′  ′  ′






 ′ ′  ′
 And in the Step 2, contract   should satisfy the following optimum 
equality. Let us write down that equation and analyze joint extremum of 
utility and contract.
′ 
    ′′   ″
 

    
 At maximum-minimum saddle solution of convexified optimization 
program, it should be that both equality first-order conditions be satisfied. 
because the second equation implies that  is positive almost 
everywhere, it should be that      : Upward-sloping constraint is 
binding here. Then, ′     ∀ at the extremum    and the 





     ∴  
 In summary, principal robustly thinks that the agent with the minimal 




 The results of theorem 2 and 4 are the same even though we approach 
the program in different aspect. It is because we get from proof of theorem 
2 that the minimizing utility of agent, given any monotonic contract  , is 
linaer utility with minimal marginal utility value. The intuition for achieving 
the linear-minimizing utility of the agent is the same across theorem 2 and 
theorem 4 : Linear utility with minimal sensitiveness to incentive is 
minimizing the principal’s payoff in this relationship because agent with 
that utility feels the minimal incentive to work so he puts the smaller effort 
level . Also, as we know that the participation constraint is binding in 
general also, because if not, principal may assume uniformly lower-valued 
utility of agent to be robust against utility-uncertainty.
 So in that case we get   . If we look at Step 2’s optimal contract 
equation, and substitute the ′    ∀, then as seen,  is 
constant and  is function of output . To make these quantities 
equal, the Lagrange multipler  should be zero intuitively.
 From theorem 2 and 4 we can link this powerful result to well-known 
literature in Principal-agent model and especially, the case of 
risk-neutrality. Well-known models where agent has the linear utility imply 
that the principal need not care about the agent’s risk sharing problem 
and can always induce the first-best action to the agent. Harris and 
Raviv(1979) firstly solves this problem without agent’s limited liability and 
showed that the fixed rent contract      can induce the first-best 
action. Innes(1990) and Kim(1999) shows later that with limited liability of 
participant in relationship, the simple contract such as debt contract or 
linear-bonus contract may achieve also the first-best incentive allocation. 
The theorem 2 and 4 quite strongly support that these solutions are robust 
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요약(국문초록)
 이 논문에서 우리는 강건계약에 대해 연구하였다. 일반적인 주인-대리인 관계에서 
주인과 대리인이 가진 정보는 주어진 것으로, 그리고 대칭적인 정보를 가정하였지만 
현실세계에서는 주인의 정보가 대리인에 비해 불확실한 경우, 그리고 대리인에 대해 
많은 것을 알지 못하는 경우의 이 관계가 더 많다고 판단되었고 따라서 이러한 상황
에서 최적 계약의 형태를 수학적으로 도출하고자 하였다. 먼저 주인이 대리인의 선호
체계를 정확하게 알지 못하지만 그의 한계효용이 유계인 상황을 가정할 경우에 최적 
계약의 형태를 도출하였고, 대리인이 일하는 기술 환경에 대해 주인이 완벽하게 믿지 
못하는 경우의 최적 계약을 도출하였다. 두 경우 모두 최적 계약의 형태가 매우 단순
하여 현실세계의 계약환경을 잘 나타내 준다고 판단하였다.
………………………………………
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